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The Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated trends in civic spaces underway before 2020 in 
Pakistan, reinforcing the state’s on-going deep discomfort with rights-based actors and 
mobilizations whilst allowing the divisive rhetoric and mass gathering of sectarian forces to 
flourish. The crisis afforded some new opportunities, too. Diverse interest groups gained 
recognition of some rights or tried to stave off further hardship during the economic 
downturn. Digital spaces became an increasingly powerful arena for activism and dissent. 
They were also targeted by security agencies, as women journalists who reported against the 
government’s narrative on its Covid-19 response discovered. 
 
This report shows how different actors responded to the pandemic in ways that affect civic 
spaces. The research identified areas of civil society which underwent some forms of public 
mobilization, whether through articulating new or ongoing claims, forming new associations, 
or using innovative strategies to respond to shrinking civic spaces. The discussion captures 
new forms of social and political action, in particular the opposition political alliance 
(Pakistan Democratic Alliance) formed in September, 2020. It ends with an assessment of the 
implications of these changes in civic spaces for the governance context in Pakistan.  
 
We used innovative qualitative research tools and media tracking during the period June-
December, 2020. We held six monthly online discussions with an observatory panel of 
experts from across Pakistan. The team conducted 14 key informant interviews, mainly 
online, with actors working with civil society in the sectors of health, education, human 
rights, media, trade unions and peasant associations. Online media sources were tracked, 
drawing from mainstream English language press, two Urdu and Sindhi online news sources, 
and social media, to identify key events as they happened, building a repository of almost 700 
articles to inform the analysis. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: it begins with an introduction of the timeline of Covid-19 
spread and state measures to curb it. The second section presents our main findings 
thematically, based on areas in which significant events took place during the period under 
review. These are (a) crisis in the health sector, (b) marginalization of religious minorities, (c) 
education and ‘controlling the narrative’, (d) missing persons protests, (e) media, (f) violence 
again women, and (g) labour and livelihood. Findings are presented in terms of the main 
events, actors, forms of association, strategies, claims and contestations, and state response. 
The third section outlines the measures that government deployed or planned to regulate civic 
spaces during 2020. The concluding section situates the research findings in the broader 






The Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated trends in civic spaces underway before 2020 in 
Pakistan, reinforcing the state’s on-going deep discomfort with rights-based actors and 
mobilizations whilst allowing the divisive rhetoric and mass gathering of sectarian forces to 
flourish. The crisis afforded some new opportunities, too. Diverse interest groups, such as 
home-based women workers, gained recognition of some rights, or, as in the case of the 
farmers’ protests, tried to stave off further hardship during the economic downturn. Digital 
spaces became an increasingly powerful arena for activism and dissent. They were also 
targeted by security agencies, as women journalists who reported against the government’s 
narrative on its Covid-19 response discovered. 
 
This report provides an overview of how different actors responded to the pandemic in ways 
that affect civic spaces. The research identified areas of civil society which underwent some 
forms of public mobilization, whether through articulating new or ongoing claims, forming 
new associations, or using innovative strategies to respond to shrinking civic spaces. The 
discussion sheds light on new forms of social and political action, in particular the opposition 
political alliance (Pakistan Democratic Alliance) that was formed in September. It ends with 
an assessment of the implications of these changes in civic spaces for the governance context 
in Pakistan.  
 
The report begins with an introduction of the timeline of Covid-19 spread and state measures 
to curb it. The second section presents our main findings thematically, based on areas in 
which significant events took place during the period under review. These are (a) crisis in the 
health sector, (b) marginalization of religious minorities, (c) education and ‘controlling the 
narrative’, (d) missing persons protests, (e) media, (f) violence again women, and (g) labour 
and livelihood. Findings are presented in terms of the main events, actors, forms of 
association, strategies, claims and contestations, and state response. The third section outlines 
the measures that government deployed or planned to regulate civic spaces during 2020. The 
concluding section situates the research findings in the broader political context and presents 
implications for governance in the near future. 
 
 
I. The Government Pandemic Response  
 
The first two cases of Covid-19 in Pakistan were identified in the capital Islamabad and its 
largest city, Karachi, in the south, at the end of February. By mid-March, cases emerged in 
the western province of Balochistan, amongst those who returned after performing religious 
pilgrimages in Iran, and in Lahore, capital of Punjab, the country’s largest province. The 
federal government suspended domestic flights as the first deaths were recorded. The Sindh 
government was first to impose full lockdown at the end of March in the province, followed 
by Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Punjab provinces. Schools, businesses and 
public transport closed for an unspecified time, testing facilities set up in major hospitals, 
quarantine accommodation hastily allocated in each province for infected travelers returning 
to the country, and camp hospitals built to accommodate large numbers of expected patients.  
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Cases continued to rise during the first lockdown period, but at a relatively slow rate. In mid-
May with a new policy of partial lockdowns in all the provinces (including compulsory mask 
wearing), cases rose faster until they peaked in mid-June. WHO identified Pakistan as the 
second hardest hit country in South Asia and with the fourteenth highest global case count. 
Its highest test positivity rate of 25.7% was recorded on 2nd June, and reported the highest 
number of daily new cases in the world on 14th June (6,825), after which the count began to 
decrease.1 
 
The number of deaths attributed to Covid-19 remained below 6,000 during the first wave and 
its immediate aftermath in July. This allowed government to claim success for its pandemic 
management and ease lockdown measures. Even as cases were still increasing, measures 
began to ease in May as the government expressed concerns over the economic impact and 
inevitable poverty outcomes of the control measures. It switched to ‘hotspot’ lockdowns, 
mandatory imposition of SOPs, and test and tracing strategies to control disease spread whilst 
cases continued to increase.2  The public, on the other hand, believed that the battle against 
Covid-19 was won. After the month of Ramzan ended in May 2020, Eid celebrations added 
to virus spread.3 By August 2020 the lockdowns were over and people broadly resumed 
normal life. 
 
But the second wave was sure to come. It began with a slow uptick in cases in September, 
gathering momentum during November until it reached 2,829 new daily cases on the first of 
December, according to official statistics.4 Obituaries of prominent individuals lost to Covid-
19 began to appear in the newspapers again as the daily death count increased, and the Chief 
Minister of Sindh tested positive and went into isolation. This time, though, official figures 
did not seem to match anecdotal, or even media observations about the extent of disease 
spread. Medical doctors publicly issued calls for the public to obey mandatory SOPs as more 
health practitioners died of Covid-19 and hospital beds filled to capacity again.5 
 
                                Figure 1. Number of Covid-19 tests & daily new cases 
 
Source: Government of Pakistan, 2020, Pakistan Cases Details. www.covid.gov.pk 
 
The federal government established a new National Command Operation Center (NCOC) to 
synergize and articulate unified national effort against Covid-19. It includes military officers 
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and is chaired by the minister of defense.  Rather than using the National Disaster 
Management Authority which was established after earthquake and flooding disasters over a 
a decade ago, the government decided to set up NCOC. The NCOC stopped widespread 
Covid-related data collection and dissemination in early April, leaving the public less 
informed from independent sources. Thus, a leading civil society group concluded the 
pandemic response at the federal level is over-centralized and allows for a direct role of 
military officials.6 
 
The government messaging on pandemic control measures was mixed at best. Prime Minister 
Khan insisted that lockdown would cause more economic hardship to the poor than it was 
worth, putting him at odds with leaders and public health officials who wanted to impose 
harsher measures during the initial weeks of the pandemic, and later when the second wave 
began. Mask-wearing was made compulsory during May 2020 but federal and provincial 
governments all had little appetite for implementing SOPs, only sporadically imposing fines 
or closing shops for violations. 
 
During the first wave the federal government injected additional funds into its existing social 
protection Ehsaas programme to provide cash payments to vulnerable families impacted by 
the lockdown measures. Media awareness campaigns, including messages administered 
through mobile phone networks and television, raised public understanding about virus 
spread. Limited testing facilities, though, made it difficult to assess the efficacy of public 
health interventions when the true spread of infection amongst the population was not 
known.7 
 
The federal and provincial governments could not forge a cohesive pandemic response to 
work effectively together to prevent disease spread and share information and resources. As 
Sindhi activist Sohail Sangi put it, “At many places the ruling party, its leadership and allies 
made every possible attempt to violate the restrictions of lockdown. Because of that common 
people were trapped in two narratives: one was of Sindh government and of WHO, while the 
second was promoting that [Covid-19] wasn’t something serious and not much different from 
a casual cough and flu.”8 
 
The federal government suggested the blame for weaknesses in pandemic response measures 
rests with the provinces. These tensions played out mainly in the province of Sindh, which 
has the only provincial government not led by the ruling party. The Prime Minister initially 
opposed lockdown arguing it would cause extreme economic hardship and starve the poor. 
The Sindh government went ahead and implemented lockdown first among the provinces and 
most strictly. The federal government attributed Sindh’s higher Covid-19 cases to 
mishandling of the outbreak, although our interviews suggest the numbers were linked with 
more frequent testing and openness with data. The significantly more populous province of 











Punjab 110 133,179 
 
3,732 
Sindh 47.9 206,489 
 
3,379 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 35.5 55,811 
 
1,563 






Azad Jammu & Kashmir* 4 8,040 
 
211 
Gilgit-Baltistan* n/a 4,832 
 
99 
Total 205.7 462,814 9,557 
*These are disputed territories, not counted in population total. 
Source: Wazir and Goujon, 2019, p.5. 
 
Inconsistent policies from the center hit Balochistan hard, although the ruling Pakistan 
Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) party is in government in that province. The federal government 
refused assistance to the Balochistan government during March and April 2020 to provide 
rations to the poor under lockdown, deepening the economic crisis by keeping its borders 
with neighboring Afghanistan and Iran closed to prevent the spread of Covid-19. Four 
thousand returnees from Iran at the border town of Taftan were kept in federally-managed 
quarantine accommodation, from which many fled reportedly due to unbearable conditions. 
Its mixed messaging on lockdown created confusion, which panelists believe added to ethno-
sectarian prejudice with some segments of the public blaming Shias and ethnic Hazaras for 
bringing Covid-19 to Pakistan.10 
 
In August 2020 unexpected heavy monsoon rainfall triggered floods around much of rural 
Pakistan and extensive urban flooding in Karachi. The NDMA struggled to cope with new 
emergency relief measures. Pandemic management took a temporary backseat. Leader of the 
Pakistan Trade Union Federation, Nasir Mansoor explains, “Sindh was hit by a third disaster 
of rain, after IMF and Covid.”11  
 
The army came under renewed criticism when elite precincts of Defence Housing Authority 
(DHA) and Clifton were subjected to some of the worst damage. Hundreds of angry 
protestors staged a sit-in outside Cantonment Board Clifton’s (CBC) office complaining their 
houses were submerged with rainwater and they were without basic utilities.12 Excessive 
media interest in the rain emergency in Sindh focused on the lack of preparedness for urban 
flooding in Karachi, adding to tensions between the federal and provincial government.  
 
The government was unwilling, or unable, to rein in religious gatherings and protests during 
the lockdown. During the first wave in Punjab, the Tableeghi Jamaat, one of the largest 
proselytizing Islamic organizations in the world, was allowed to hold its annual congregation 
in Raiwind, which became a super-spreader event. As the second wave rose, sectarian 
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protests by the Tehreek-i-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) brought together hundreds of thousands in 
Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore, even at the funeral of TLP leader Khadim Hussain Rizvi 
who is suspected to have died of Covid-19. Thus, when PDM leaders launched a series of 
anti-government protests despite pandemic control measures and warnings of potential 
disease spread, they were able to cite the federal government’s inconsistent policies in their 
own defence.13 
 
During October 2020, Pakistan entered the second wave of the pandemic and measures to 
control public life are beginning to increase. It was praised for controlling the virus in the 
first phase when Imran Khan touted the country as a success story in the global fight against 
the pandemic. During his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2020 he 
highlighted the government's relief package and smart lockdown strategy that helped control 
the virus and stabilize the economy.14 As education institutions, public places, marriage halls 
etc began to open up, the cases also started rising and the country is now officially moving 
towards its second wave with an average of 1,300 cases per day. NCOC issued a lockdown 
warning and called for better compliance with Covid-19 SOPs.15 Mini and smart lockdowns 
were imposed in different districts in Punjab.16 
 
As the second wave gathered force in November 2020, workplaces were asked to have 50 
percent office staff and masks became mandatory, this time with a fine for non-compliance. 
After the Gilgit-Baltistan elections, but before the major opposition rallies, a ban on public 
gatherings was imposed. The number of guests permitted at private events came down to 
500.17 Karachi traders resisted reduced business timings as shops struggled to make up for 
annual losses during the busy holiday season.18 Education institutions, most of which had 
opened, were closed from the end of November 2020 until mid-January 2021 after a series of 
outbreaks in different parts of the country.19 With the start of winter wedding and holiday 
season in December 2020, it was inevitable that cases would continue to rise into the new 
year. 
 
II. Civil Society under Covid-19 
 
We used innovative qualitative research tools and media tracking during the period June-
December, 2020. Six monthly online discussions were held with an observatory panel of 
experts from across Pakistan.20 We supplemented the panelists’ real-time insights into on-
going developments by 14 key informant interviews, mainly online, with actors working with 
civil society in the sectors of health, education, human rights, media, trade unions and 
peasant associations. We tracked online media sources, drawing from mainstream English 
language press, two Urdu and Sindhi online news sources, and social media, to identify key 
events as they happened. 
 
Our tracking of formal media sources and social media posts created a repository of 700 
articles about events in civic space from June through December 2020. We inductively coded 
the reports about events during the media tracking process to draw out the thematic areas 
which saw contention, debate or protest. Figure 2 illustrates the number of news reports in 
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each of these thematic areas. Most media coverage (167) pertained to issues around 
governance – tensions between the federal and provincial governments, politicians, and 
political parties, exacerbated by the pandemic and its impact on society. Issues around the 
pandemic management also featured prominently (74), while the other areas in which 
significant events took place affecting civic spaces received more modest attention in the 
media.  
 
None of these areas are new. Contestations and claims within civil society around violence 
against women, regulations affecting civic spaces, enforced disappearances (missing 
persons), the marginalization of religious minority communities, media freedom, have been 
areas of significant mobilization for many decades. During 2020, civic spaces became re-
energized as the impact of Covid-19 deepened existing vulnerabilities. We saw protests 
around labour and livelihood rights as jobs became threatened, students claims for support 
and space in educational institutions, and health workers demands for protection and benefits 




The discussion below presents our findings thematically, with additional insights into the 
events, claims, and contestations drawn from our key informant interviews and observatory 
panel discussions. 
 
A. Crisis in the Health Sector 
 
The pandemic opened wide the agenda of an already agitated sector of the workforce – the 
health service providers. Two groups of providers (medical doctors and community health 
care workers) were already engaged in ongoing collective action to secure the conditions of 
their employment before the pandemic struck, lending greater urgency to their protests as 
government continued with its plans to privatize public hospitals and failed to protect 
frontline service providers with adequate protections from infection. Other providers are 






















Figure 2: News reports by thematic area during 
Covid-19 (June-Dec 2020)
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may coalesce across the health sector in 2021. The strategies deployed include the threat of 
strikes, street protests, press conferences, and court petitions.  
 
Health-care providers at all levels began to report outbreaks of Covid-19 infection amongst 
the healthcare workforce in May 2020.21 Doctors in Sindh pleaded for stricter lockdown 
measures in April to ease the burden on healthcare facilities22 in what would be a regular 
series of appeals to government and public throughout the year to take the pandemic more 
seriously and spare doctors’ lives. By June, 1,200 doctors, 333 nurses and 628 paramedics 
had contracted the virus.23 Government was unable to provide adequate personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and monitor SOPs in public and private healthcare facilities, so doctors 
turned to NGOs for supplies.24  
 
The pandemic added fuel to doctors’ campaign against the privatization of medical colleges 
and public hospitals, which is planned as part of the IMF mandated reforms in the 
provinces.25 Doctors argued privatization would make healthcare less accessible to the poor, 
and endanger their job security as government employees. 26 The province of Punjab was the 
first to pass the Medical Teaching Institutes (MTI) Reforms Act in March, 2020. Paramedical 
staff, nurses and young doctors joined forces in The Grand Health Alliance (GHA) in 
opposition to this law and to prevent similar moves in the other provinces. 
 
As the pandemic rolled on, so did the protests. One GHA doctor complained they were being 
sent without PPE to the frontline to save patients, although soldiers are equipped for the 
battles they must fight.27 Doctors and nurses protested against physical assaults by angry 
patients prevented from seeing infected or dead relatives in hospitals. They protested against 
the lack of PPE; demanded compensation for sick and dead amongst their cadres, and called 
for improved budgetary allocation for the health sector.28 They even staged token strikes in 
outpatient departments and in hospital wards, including Covid wards.29 Whereas in the city of 
Quetta the police arrested protesting healthcare providers,30 in Lahore the government agreed 
to negotiate with GHA doctors holding a sit-in to demand PPE, regular screening of 
providers, and a risk allowance.31 In Karachi, a government official agreed to negotiate with 
staff from a maternity hospital salaries refusing to work until they were paid. 32  
 
Government tried to fill the demand for nurses to manage the Covid-19 emergency in 
hospitals, by hiring additional nurses. They, too, soon spoke out against lack of PPE and non-
payment of salaries. 33 When dozens became infected with the virus in May they staged a sit-
in in Karachi. 34 By October, nurses joined the Lady Health Workers (LHWs) major protest in 
Islamabad.35  
 
LHWs are Pakistan’s front-line community health workers, providing vaccinations, 
contraception and maternal health screening in rural and peri-urban sites. They have formed 
successful associations to improve their employment conditions since 2010. LHWs hold 
strikes, sit-ins and file legal petitions to demand salary raises, integration into the government 
service structure, and other benefits.36 During the pandemic, they were expected to carry out 
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their duties without adequate PPE, and given a limited health risk allowance.37 Because 
contraceptive supplies ran out soon due to global supply chain disruptions during the 
summer, LHWs were unable to meet the demand in the communities they serve.38 In October 
2020 thousands held a sit-in for seven days in front of the National Assembly in Islamabad to 
demand improvements to their service structure and employment benefits, along with life 
insurance and greater security during their outreach work. Government promised to meet 
their demands in the coming months.39 
 
The federal government has announced unpopular changes to the examination structure and 
licensing system for medical students.40 Medical experts say the new regulations 
would undermine students’ learning and add to their financial burden.41 Infuriated students 
filed a petition against Pakistan Medical Council and after vigorous online activism the Sindh 
High Court delayed the medical school admissions exam. Students and members of the 
Young Doctors’ Association staged protests against the new date because of rising Covid-19 
cases in the country.42 The exam took place anyway, but students filed another petition 
questioning its authenticity and legality and demanding a re-test, which was still pending at 
the time of writing this report.43 
 
 
B. Marginalizing Religious Minorities 
 
Pakistan is predominately Sunni Muslim, approximately five per cent of the population are 
Christian, Hindu, Parsi, or Sikh, although the exact numbers remain unclear.44 Ahmadiyyas 
consider themselves to be a sect of Islam but are classified as a religious minority. They are 
increasingly persecuted since a constitutional amendment in 1974 declared them non-
Muslims after after a long campaign by religious organizations and parties. Shias constitute 
an estimated 20 per cent of the country’s mainly Muslim population. In recent years 
thousands have died in violent sectarian attacks from extremist groups,45 who believe Shias 
are kafirs (unbelievers) and call upon the state to declare them non-Muslims. The growing 
sectarianism in public and religious discourse has led to growing persecution against Shias. 
During 2021 the vulnerability of all these religious groups continued to deepen, as evidenced 
by an increase in use of blasphemy laws to target their communities, the mobilization of 
sectarian political forces, and anti-Hindu practices. 
 
Weaponising the blasphemy laws 
 
During the 1980s, the state passed a series of increasingly harsh laws to punish blasphemy 
against Islam, as part of the Islamization policy under military rule General Zia ul-Haq. 
These laws are used to settle scores or blackmail vulnerable members amongst all faiths, 
Muslims included. Lower courts have passed a number of death sentences against individuals 
from religious minority communities accused of blasphemy, although none have been carried 
out. While a few progressive political leaders, intellectuals and activists call for reviewing the 
laws, the issue is dangerously politicized. In 2011, when the Governor of Punjab suggested a 
review of the laws after a Christian woman was sentenced to death for blasphemy, he was 
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assassinated. The assassin was later given the death penalty, yet he remains publicly revered 
as a martyr who served the cause of Islam.46 Academic Arfana Mallah argues the blasphemy 
law is often used “by powerful religious groups, state institutions and the invisible forces to 
silence and scare the people.”47 
 
Our event tracking from June to December 2020 revealed during the pandemic’s first six 
months blasphemy accusations and vigilante actions against individuals increased. The 
government appeared unsure whether to condemn or condone the rise in cases. For example, 
some politicians praised a man for murdering a mentally unwell individual attending a court 
hearing in Peshawar on blasphemy charges. An educated urban-based woman ran a Twitter 
campaign to assassinate another person accused of blasphemy, without legal consequences. 
Religious extremists charged Sindhi cultural figures with blasphemy, with possible political 
motives. A Sindhi university professor was charged with blasphemy, as was Arfana Mallah 
when she spoke out in his defense.48 A politician from the ruling PTI filed a blasphemy 
complaint in July 2020 against Khwaja Asif, an opposition politician, for saying that all 
religions are equal.49 A fresh wave of accusations against Ahmadiyyas led to more vigilante 
murders.50 
 
September 2020 began with thousands protesting all over Pakistan against French magazine 
Charlie Hebdo’s reprinting of cartoons mocking Islam. These were organized by the Tehreek-
i-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), an extremist religious party, whose members charged the re-printing 
of these cartoons amounts to “big terrorism.”51 TLP leader Khadim Hussain Rizvi led a large 
protest sit-in outside the capital Islamabad. Two days later TLP leader Khadim Hussain Rizvi 
developed high fever and shortness of breath; he died without being tested for Covid-19.52 
His funeral the next day (21 Nov 2020), in Lahore, was attended by hundreds of thousands of 
mourners despite government guidelines against large gatherings.  
 
The federal government clearly accommodated TLP’s protest against the Hebdo cartoons 
despite the sectarian and extremist nature of the group. It ignored an order from the 
Islamabad High Court that the right to protest and assembly should not cause disturbance to 
citizens.53 Its ministers reached a deal with TLP  to end the Islamabad protest by promising to 
expel the French ambassador in the next three months and releasing the workers who staged 
the sit-in.54 The Punjab government helped to arrange his funeral attended by hundreds of 





One of the initial entry points for Covid-19 was its western border in Balochistan, which 
serves as a crossing point for Shia pilgrims from Pakistan to visit holy shrines in Iran. A 
quarantine camp set up at the border crossing of Taftan became a hotbed of cases. This led to 
a proliferation of hate speech in social media, blaming Shias and the tiny ethnic Hazara 
community for bringing the pandemic to the country.56 The Hazara community is largely 
Shia. For over a decade they have been specifically targeted through bomb attacks and 
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assassinations by sectarian forces. Due to their perceived ties with Iran, they were among the 
Shias initially blamed for the spread of Covid-19. Many returnees were put in government 
quarantine centers, along with other pilgrims, but confined for longer periods and subject to 
mistreatment.57 The Balochistan government asked Hazara employees not to come to work, 
citing caution but clearly targeting the Shia community.58 
 
August 2020 was the month of Muharram in the Islamic lunar calendar, during which Shia 
Muslims carrying out mourning processions on the streets. Rising sectarian tensions led to a 
surge in blasphemy cases against Shia clerics, procession leaders, and those hosting religious 
gatherings (majlis) in mosques or their homes.59 Police even registered a case against a three-
year old child for hosting a majlis in his house.60 At least 42 blasphemy cases were registered 
during the month, mostly against Shia Muslims.61 
 
The increase in cases may have contributed to sectarian behavior amongst the wider 
population. A teenager in Mansehra, a town in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in the north-
west, was coerced to profess his allegiance to the Sunni sect and declare followers of other 
Muslims sects to be infidel, all this under police observation.62 A Sunni supremacist militant 
group targeted a young Shia man by firing at his car.63 
 
The government did not take sufficient action to counter this momentum, despite some initial 
measures during September 2020. The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority 
(PEMRA) suspended the license of a television news channel for airing allegedly 
blasphemous remarks during a special Muharram transmission. The channel’s CEO was 
booked under the law for inciting hate, after which he issued an apology saying the editorial 
board failed to exercise sufficient control.64 Special cells of the Punjab Police monitoring 
religious gatherings, and social media websites (Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) took over a 
hundred clerics into custody for promoting sectarianism, and registered cases against them.65 
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) demanded more decisive steps to ensure 
the state upholds all citizens’ right to freedom of religion and belief. It asked the police stop 
registering blasphemy cases so swiftly as such complaints are often fabricated and based on 
personal vendettas.66 
 
Thousands of anti-Shia protestors linked to Sunni extremist groups e.g. Sipah e Sahaba (a 
banned anti-Shia militant organization) joined by TLP were permitted to rally in urban 
centers to further their agenda to have Shia Muslims declared infidels.67 The rallies were 
triggered by yet another blasphemy accusation against a Shia leader during a majlis.68 This 
was the first time three prominent Sunni Muslim groups - Deobandi, Sufi Barelvi and Salafi – 
all held public rallies in a single week.69 
 
 
Persecution of Hindus 
 
In June 2020, the federal government acted upon a recommendation by the National 
Commission for Human Rights and directed a Hindu temple be built in the capital city 
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Islamabad. This episode, and the manner in which it was mishandled, highlights the extent of 
the state’s reluctance to safeguard and nurture religious freedoms and discourse. First, a local 
resident filed a court petition against the move, arguing that it violated the city’s master 
plan.70 Next, the government sought to avoid a growing political controversy, with some 
opposition politicians joining in to criticize the construction, by referring the matter to the 
Council of Islamic Ideology.71 (This is an advisory body whose role is to advise the state’s 
laws and policies to help them remain in consonance with Islamic teachings. It is responsible 
for drafting discriminatory laws and advocating policies against religious minorities and 
women in the name of Islamizing Pakistan.72) Religious leaders favoured building the temple 
elsewhere, and a government spokesman suggested creation of an ‘interfaith enclave’ to 
house non-Muslim places of worship in the capital. A ruling party politician meanwhile 
charged an opposition politician with blasphemy for commenting that all religions should 
have equal importance.73 
 
The August 2020 floods damaged property and livelihoods in rural Sindh, where a majority 
of Pakistan’s small Hindu population reside. Humanitarian relief through welfare 
organizations during disasters is commonplace, however they have been accused of 
discrimination against non-Muslims on occasion during relief distribution. In the following 
months, civil society protests broke out in some small localities in Sindh’s eastern districts, 
charging that relief workers were reluctant to provide goods to the local Hindu population, 
prompting politicians to promise to look into the problem.74 Even at the Sindh provincial 
level, political parties are reluctant to pass laws to protect minorities from forced conversion 
due to fear of the religious right. Reluctance amongst Muslim Sindhis to speak out in support 
Hindus is also a new phenomenon, linked with increase in right-wing actors around the 
province. One key informant suggested that Covid-19 provided a golden opportunity to act 
against these trends by bringing government, administration and civil society together, but it 
was missed because ‘unfortunately our society is losing its sense of social responsibility.’75 
 
C. Education Sector and ‘Controlling the Narrative’  
 
The pandemic and subsequent lockdowns have brought to the surface festering tensions and 
issues in the education sector in Pakistan. Live debate, advocacy initiatives and protest 
actions persisted during the period under review despite restrictions on public assembly and 
media coverage. The main issues and contestations were related to academic freedom, 
resources for higher education, the digital divide, harassment on campuses, students’ right to 
form association, and provincial quotas in public sector universities.  
 
The pivot to online higher education under Covid-19 exposed inequalities in access to 
education in new ways, and our panelists made a number of observations about this. The 
levelling effect of the university space has been lost, as have the facilities for studying 
afforded by hostel accommodation. The digital divide limits access for students who attend 
public universities and live in rural areas. Many cannot connect to the internet from their 
homes. In rural areas of Sindh, students crowd onto buses to attend online classes in the 
nearest town with internet access. With hostels closed, some rent crowded rooms in small 
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towns to attend in person classes or access internet. Girls living at home again are pushed into 
domestic duties that prevent them attending online classes. Students from low income homes 
are reluctant to reveal their settings on video during online sessions, affecting their ability to 
participate. In Balochistan, schools and colleges in districts affected by the nationalist 
insurgency and army clampdown are regularly closed, and internet access almost non-
existent for security reasons. Even for teachers, e.g. mothers with small children, they have 
lost the equalizing space in which they can carry out work unhindered by domestic 
responsibilities. The ways in which these divides are affecting students also undermine the 
very SOPs put into place for their protection from Covid-19. 
 
During the two years preceding the pandemic, university students across Pakistan held 
Student Solidarity Marches to demand the restoration of student unions in universities, higher 
budgets, accountability for sexual harassment. They are increasingly supported by an active 
Teachers’ Association that calls for enhanced freedom of academic expression on campuses 
and numerous civil society organizations. The students’ demands are reminiscent of the 
left/progressive student activism in the 1960s that led to the overthrow of the military-led 
government. To counter their voices, new campus-based groups emerged in support of right-
wing causes, e.g. State Youth Parliament and Friends of the Pakistan Army. Interviews 
suggest student members of these groups report to intelligence agencies about the activities of 
progressive students and teachers, purportedly to protect the religion and ideology of 
Pakistan. Some members of the new groups were involved in blasphemy accusations against 
professors in Sindh during the summer.76 
 
After a well-known Sindhi scholar and university professor was arrested for blasphemy, 
possibly motivated by a political dispute, the President of the Sindh University Teachers’ 
Association spoke out in his defense.77 Professor Arfana Mallah, who is also a women’s 
rights activist and prominent supporter of the restoration of student unions in universities, 
called for reforming the blasphemy laws. A right-wing religious party threatened to file a 
blasphemy case against her if she did not retract her comments. The same party had 
unsuccessfully petitioned the courts to block the Women’s March from being held in Sindh in 
March 2020, alleging the feminists violate religious and cultural norms.78  
 
Mallah was forced into hiding after death threats, and soon apologized for her statement 
through an online video message a few days later.79 She recalls, 
 
Twenty-two parties united against a single woman - Shia, Sunni, Wahhabi and 
Deobandis, who in normal circumstances do not consider each other Muslim [but] were 
united in my case. Initially, I decided to register a harassment case against them as we 
were deprived of breathing space but later I reached the conclusion that here you have 
to either pay the price of being with your life or you have to follow their code of 
conduct.80 
 
Women’s groups, the Sindh Human Rights Commission, progressive political organizations 
together called for her protection and the charges to be dropped.81  
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During September and October, students in Punjab protested against the 2018 reduction of 
quotas for students from other provinces in public sector universities. They charged that the 
new policy is a deliberate attempt to prevent students outside Punjab from building support 
for Pashtun or Baloch nationalism on its campuses. Students from Balochistan held a long 
march to Punjab, which generated interest and support on social media but received minimal 
coverage in mainstream outlets due to government restrictions on coverage of dissident 
voices.  
 
The annual Student Solidarity March took place in Lahore and other cities in late November. 
Protestors followed all SOPs and peacefully communicated their demands related to the 
revival of student unions, harassment committees on campuses and internet provision 
throughout the country for all students.82 Activist and member of Haqooq e Khalq Movement 
Ammar Ali Jan helped organize the march and mobilized students to demand a higher 
education budget, revival of student unions and an end to sexual harassment on campuses.83 
Right after the protest, a case was registered against him as a “potential danger to public 
peace, law and order situation”.84 Under Section 3 (power to arrest and detain suspected 
persons) of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, the activist was to be arrested for 30 
days.85 The order said he was a “symbol of frightens” which became a popular Twitter 
hashtag for civil society members demanding justice for the activist.86 The Chief Justice of 
Lahore High Court suspended the notification against him and called the detention order an 
unconstitutional attack on civil liberties and an example of political victimization.87 
 
The disruption to students’ education may add momentum to an organized student movement 
in the future. Student leader Rai Ali observed that student unions have been banned for the 
last forty years; an acknowledgement of the role of progressive students in overthrowing the 
military regimes of Ayub Khan in 1969 and protests against General Zia ul-Haq’s 
government during the 1980s.88 Despite the pressure from intelligence agencies to end their 
protests, the state will be unable to stop them if students across the country are united in their 
demands, in his view. The Student Solidarity March began to voice the demands of other 
vulnerable groups, too; in Lahore over a thousand poor rural workers joined the 2020 March. 
Students also participated in the 2020 Aurat March, an expression of their support for 
feminist causes, in particular the issue of sexual harassment on campuses. They planned to 
protest again in 2021 if their demands are not met.  
 
Small groups of students in other parts of the country protested against the haphazard and 
inconsistent policies in education related to Covid-19. Bahria University students in 
Islamabad were forced to appear on-campus for their mid-term examinations amidst rising 
Covid-19 cases in the country and lack of hostel facilities.89 They demonstrated in front of 
the Islamabad Press Club and carried out digital protests through Twitter hashtags, 
#BahriaUniversity and #NoOffCampusExams.90 Marvi hostel in Sindh University was sealed 
after some students tested positive but before the female students could remove their 




Curriculum Reform  
 
The PTI government promised to reform the education sector when it came to power in 2018, 
by making it more culturally appropriate and standardizing the curriculum to overcome the 
class divide which favors English-speaking private schools and disadvantages those who 
study in government-funded institutions.92 Punjab Assembly passed a bill in July to ban all 
books that do not contain a specific reference to the Prophet’s finality (in the line of 
Prophets), which would effectively take out of circulation many English-language social 
science material currently taught. Civil society groups wrote press articles, circulated 
petitions, and submitted a letter to the provincial assembly to raise their concerns about the 
bill.93 Shia religious leaders pointed out that the proposed legislation would lead to sectarian 
conflict, which led to some backtracking by ruling party.94  
 
Meanwhile the federal government announced it was ready to bring in a new Single National 
Curriculum (SNC) to give all Pakistanis access to the same quality of education and reduce 
the disadvantages faced by lower socio-economic groups in their schooling.95 The actual 
content of the whole SNC was not released, prompting a Right to Information petition from 
civil society groups. The SNC created enormous media attention and debate; civil society 
groups and education experts debated its merits in webinars, and television channels held 
panel discussions with government representatives who defended the initiative.96 
 
The core of the reforms is the inclusion of hefty amounts of Islamic/Quranic content into the 
primary school curriculum, to be overseen by people trained in the madrassas, or religious 
seminaries. Critics viewed the move as part of a deal between the government and 
madrassas, in return for incorporating part of the SNC they will get a presence in government 
schools, in effect a continuation of General Zia’s Islamization measures. Other reforms are 
absent, such as the much-needed higher budgetary outlay for education, increased 
expenditure on teacher training, and building of additional schools.97 Education experts 
argued since government quietly gave permission for elite private schools to retain their 
internationally accredited curricula, the purpose of the SNC was already defeated.  
 
The public debate continued through August, forcing government to defend its position at 
multiple forums. During an online session, an advisor to the government claimed 400 
curriculum experts approved the SNC, although at least one of the academics mentioned in 
the list denied that he was part of the committee.98 Critics from civil society groups said SNC 
was a move to centralize the state by pushing the idea of one nation, one curriculum, and one 
religion, as a plan to weaken the provinces by using religion as a binding force.99  
 
Education is, in fact, a provincial subject; it is within the jurisdiction of provincial 
governments to decide the language and content of their curriculum. The Sindh government, 
led by the Pakistan People’s Party with a history of animosity towards the Islamization 
project, declined to adopt the SNC in its entirety, suggesting only some core elements would 
be included and not in social science subjects.100 Thus, the issue increased federal-provincial 
tensions, and deepened political fault lines. On one side were political forces and supporters 
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in civil society who supported provincial autonomy and an education system respectful of the 
cultural and ethnic heterogeneity of the country. On the other were religious groups, 
conservative political interests and the military’s security establishment which use 
Islamization to creating a homogenizing national narrative, for which control over the media 
and education system are essential tools. 
 
D. Missing Persons Protests 
 
The practice of enforced disappearances began during Pakistan’s crackdown on militants 
after 9/11, during the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf. It is believed that security 
agencies are responsible for the disappearance of hundreds of individuals accused of 
terrorism from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province where the military quelled the Taliban-led 
insurgency on the border regions with Afghanistan in a series of operations ending in 2015. 
In Balochistan, which has seen decades of nationalist insurgencies, according to activist 
leader Mama Qadeer, 47,000 Baloch and 35,000 Pashtuns are missing.101 More recently in 
Sindh, where some political activists demand greater autonomy, enforced disappearances are 
increasing. 
 
A number of civil society groups advocate for the return of missing persons. Amina Janjua 
founded Defence for Human Rights, after her husband went missing in 2005 in a crackdown 
against suspect Islamists after 9/11. Families of victims in the army action to rid an 
Islamabad seminary of militants also formed a group to demand information about of their 
whereabouts. Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) stages sit-ins, long marches and 
hunger strikes, with its most visible leader a man called Mama Qadeer whose son was first 
disappeared then found dead. In 2015 after the discovery of mass graves and mutilated 
bodies, the Supreme Court ordered the government to produce lists of the missing persons in 
Pakistan.102 
 
In 2017 the Pakistan government established a second Commission of Inquiry on Enforced 
Disappearances to trace the missing, fix responsibility for disappearances and register police 
cases against individuals involved. It was informed of 6,752 cases between 2011-2020.103 
The Commission came under scathing critique by the International Commission of Jurists for 
failing to define enforced disappearances according to standards of international law, e.g. it 
does not recognize secret detention nor the role of non-state actors in carrying out abductions 
on behalf of the state. It failed to fix responsibility or file police reports against those 
responsible for concealing the whereabouts of missing persons in government detention 
centers.104 
 
The issue remained prominent even during the pandemic, as it emerged that security forces 
continued the strategy of abduction and disappearance of activists from ethno-nationalist 
movements: Seraiki, Sindhi, Baloch, and Pashtun. Those from civil society against this 
strategy found themselves investigated, monitored and harassed too, including women’s 
rights activists from Women’s Action Forum, the Women’s Democratic Front, and Human 
Rights Commission of Pakistan. This added to the climate of fear, preventing these groups 
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from uniting publicly around the cause. Although it cannot be determined what effect, if any, 
the pandemic had on the rate of disappearances, the extensive media coverage of the problem 
and civil society activism during the period under review ensured it remained a visible issue. 
 
In August 2020, families of Baloch missing persons staged their annual Eid sit-in in front of 
the Quetta and Karachi Press Clubs demanding the release of their disappeared loved ones.105 
The same month, Hayat Baloch, a student pursuing a Master’s degree from Karachi 
University, was shot eight times outside his home in Balochistan by personnel of the Frontier 
Corps (FC). The incident took place after the para-military force’s convoy came under attack 
from an IED blast.106 Students and social media activists protested against what appeared to 
be a revenge murder by the security forces as part of their strategy to quell the insurgency. 
The outcry led to a judicial inquiry. Soon the police arrested an FC soldier who confessed to 
the killing.107 
 
The same month another enforced disappearance drew attention to similar cases in Sindh. 
Sarang Joyo, a young researcher who works on missing persons cases and campaigns for the 
repatriation of Afghan refugees, was abducted from his home. As civil society raised the 
alarm on social media, his own father, the prominent Sindhi writer and poet Taj Joyo, was 
nominated for the government’s Pride of Performance award on Independence Day. He 
refused the award in protest against his son’s abduction.108 His wife submitted an application 
to the Sindh High Court for her son’s recovery.109 Ten days later Joyo returned home, 
promising his campaign for the rights of missing persons would continue.110 
 
Resolution of the missing persons issue is undoubtedly in the political domain. Farooq 
Kubdani, an academic and human rights activist suggests that if the state, or establishment 
wishes to, it could open dialogue with the insurgents in Balochistan. As a first step to 
normalizing relations, it would be a good gesture to release hundreds of missing persons. It 
appears the establishment is unwilling to take these steps.111 
 
The Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) began in the former Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas in the aftermath of the military action to quell the Taliban insurgency. Youth leaders 
worked with conflict-affected communities to document the number of missing persons. 
While some of the disappeared have indeed been returned, many PTM leaders were arrested 
and charged with sedition for their demands. Media coverage of PTM protests is largely 
banned, but nonetheless continues sporadically. In October, women from the region North 
Waziristan held a sit-in to seek the release of their male family members picked up by 
security forces during a raid after a bomb attack on a military convoy in their area.112  
 
 
E. Media  
 
Media voices became increasingly unruly and dangerous for critics of the state during 2020. 
A new trend of ‘missing’ journalists adding to an atmosphere of fear about voicing issues that 
challenge the state-sponsored narrative around security, national ideology, and sources of 
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corruption. Over the past two years 49 journalists were booked on various charges by the 
Federal Investigation Agency, along with the arrest of major news moghul and Geo’s chief 
editor Mir Shakeel ur-Rahman.113 Panel respondents believed government supporters and 
related intelligence agencies use social media, particularly Twitter, to foster ethnic and 
religious hatred. Twitter campaigns stoked hatred amongst people of different ethnic groups 
(the city has had decades of violent ethnic-based conflict) in the city of Karachi, and 
criticized the provincial government. Some prominent journalists joined in these trends, 
possibly under political pressure. Progressive groups and individuals found these campaigns 
hard to counter through their own social media activities. 
 
In July a prominent journalist, Matiullah Jan, was picked up by unidentified security forces in 
Islamabad, in broad daylight. He was blindfolded, taken to an undisclosed location, and 
severely beaten.114 Jan, who previously worked for mainstream media outlets, now runs his 
own YouTube channel, where he is an outspoken critic of the government. The reason for his 
abduction may have been Jan’s support for a senior judge of the Supreme Court, Qazi Faez 
Isa, who is under investigation for tax issues. Some allege the investigation is an effort to 
block him from becoming Chief Justice.115 After outcry from fellow journalists, a twitter 
campaign, and statements from numerous human rights groups both locally and 
internationally, Jan was released.116 His abductors suggested they picked up the wrong man. 
A few days later, the para-military Rangers raided the Karachi Press Club in an unusual 
move, adding to the intimidation of journalists. 
 
A journalist’s expose put military corruption under public scrutiny despite the state’s efforts 
to control content on mainstream media sources. Ahmed Noorani, a journalist and co-founder 
of the independent investigative news website, ‘FactFocus’ published an article about the 
financial assets of retired Army General Asim Saleem Bajwa in August. At the time he 
chaired the Chinese-financed infrastructure projects and also served as the Prime Minister’s 
Special Assistant on Information and Broadcasting. The article revealed how his family 
business expanded to four countries concurrently with his rise through the military’s ranks.117 
ARY, a privately-owned news channel, quickly aired a segment labeling this report as fake 
news, suggesting the journalist works for anti-state interests.118 Noorani, who moved outside 
the country after facing an attack, began to receive death threats via multiple social media 
sites including Facebook and Twitter. The Prime Minister did not accept Bajwa’s offer of 
resignation,119 but his chairmanship of the Chinese investment programme lapsed soon after 
and was not renewed. Our panelists noted that social media account holders were reluctant to 
re-tweet Noorani’s investigative story for fear of harassment or going missing. Instead, they 
started a trend of tweeting the name of the pizza company owned by Bajwa’s family. 
 
Attempts to silence media voices critical of the state continue. In September, another 
journalist, Bilal Farooqui, was abducted from his residence in Karachi for sharing “highly 
provocative” posts on his social media platforms against the army and allegedly spewing 
religious hate. The Karachi Union of Journalists (KUJ) claimed his arrest was part of a 
concerted campaign to gag free and independent voices.120 The police filed a case against 
Absar Alam, a journalist and ex-chairman of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory 
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Authority (PEMRA) over ‘high treason’ upon a complaint by a lawyer accusing him of 
posting inappropriate comments against the army on his Twitter account.121 
 
The practice of trolling and harassing women journalists is a growing problem,122 but it 
reached a new level when those critical of the government’s pandemic management began to 
be threatened as they were accused of spreading fake news and taking bribes.  In August 
2020, a group of well-known women journalists from press and television demanded 
protection against the “vicious attacks” by individuals linked to the ruling PTI party. Their 
joint statement which grew into a petition supported by activists, media, and others.123 They 
demanded government restrain its supporters from targeting women in the media, and hold 
individuals accountable for harassing women journalists. They turned to the Standing 
Committees on Human Rights on the upper and the lower house of Parliament to take notice 
and hold the government accountable. Pakistan People Party’s chairman, Bilawal Bhutto, 
who chaired the Standing Committee, said there was no justification for rape or death threats 
against women journalists and it was everyone’s responsibility to stand with those facing 
harassment.124 
 
Media rights groups Bolo Bhi and Digital Rights Foundation, along with feminist groups and 
human rights defenders who signed the petition deliberately avoided making a demand for 
further regulation of digital spaces to curb online harassment. Their intention was to hold 
government accountable for allowing its official social media accounts to be used to harass 
women reporters, and ask it to exercise restraint. Our panelists were of the view that when the 
government insists journalists remain ‘neutral’ in their reporting, they actually mean 
favorable coverage.  
 
The stress on media and outspoken journalists increased alongside growing political tensions 
in the country. In October, after the combined opposition Pakistan Democratic Movement 
held its protest meeting in Karachi, the Inspector General of Sindh Police was abducted and 
taken to a military commander’s office. He was forced to order the arrest of opposition leader 
Maryam Nawaz’s husband, for illegally chanting political slogans at the mausoleum of the 
founder of Pakistan.125 A television journalist disappeared a day after he broadcasted CCTV 
footage showing the arrest; although upon protests by press associations, civil society and 
human rights groups he was released a day later.126 
 
The Sindh provincial police force threatened rebellion over the manner in which their IG was 
pressured. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, chairman of the PPP, asked the Army Chief General 
Bajwa and the head of an intelligence agency to investigate what their institution was doing 
in Sindh.127 Exhibiting unusual responsiveness to public and political backlash, the 
intelligence operative who ordered the arrest of Nawaz’s husband and kidnapping of the 






F. Violence Against Women 
 
Gender-based violence is a focal concern of the women’s movement in Pakistan. During the 
pandemic rates of domestic violence appeared to increase, and access to helplines and 
shelters constrained.129 As the provincial government, assisted by donors and civil society 
groups, moved to protect these services and opened more helplines, a series of new rape and 
forced marriage cases captured media attention. The government response was haphazard and 
often incoherent. 
 
In what became known as the “motorway rape”, in September 2020 a woman was raped in 
front of her children by two unidentified men after her car broke down one night on a 
motorway outside the city of Lahore. A senior police officer in charge of the case, Umer 
Sheikh, blamed the woman herself for the attack.130 Maulana Tariq Jameel, a famous 
religious scholar claimed that co-education and obscenity in the country result in such 
incidents, views echoed by the Prime Minister.131 In response, women’s groups in urban 
centers held small protest demonstrations against the rape and the police officer’s victim-
blaming comments. 132 Journalists and feminists wrote a ‘Letter to the State of Pakistan’ 
highlighting cases of unbridled gender-based violence and laying out a Charter of Demands 
to ensure women’s safety and security.133After a dozen arrests and a man-hunt two accused 
were captured and pleaded guilty,134 but the police officer Sheikh remains in his post.135  
 
Meanwhile the Ministry of Human Rights recognized the longstanding feminist position that 
the two-finger test of rape victims, to determine if a woman is sexually active, violates their 
fundamental right to dignity. Activists successfully petitioned the court to pan the procedure 
in Punjab.136 
The Prime Minister triggered a national debate by suggesting further punitive laws, including 
chemical castration and public hanging for serial rapists would address the problem of VAW. 
Women’s rights activists are opposed to the death penalty and argue that existing laws 
against sexual violence require more effective implementation to reduce crimes. Still, on 24th 
November 2020, the federal government approved two anti-rape ordinances. The new laws 
include voluntary chemical castration and hanging as punishments, but not in public. The 
Draft Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Ordinance, 2020 establishes special courts for 
women and children along with Anti-rape Cells and improved investigative procedures.137 
Lawyers countered that unless policing is improved, prosecutors properly trained, and public 
awareness increased, harsh legislation will not suffice to address the problem of rape.138 
Forced marriages and abductions of underage girls from religious minority communities may 
have increased during 2020, although accurate data is not available. Advocacy groups believe 
further changes in laws around age of marriage and consent, and more robust government 
programmes are needed to end these practices.139 A new case drew headlines in October, 
when a 13-year old Christian girl, Arzoo Raja, was abducted, forcefully converted, and 
married to a 44-year-old Muslim. Arzoo’s parents went to court alleging rape and child 
marriage.140 Members of the Christian community, activists, and lawyers protested in Karachi 
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demand her return. Arzoo was moved to a shelter home under police protection and her 
abductor and accomplices remain in custody.141 
 
These cases, and the sexual harassment of women journalists discussed earlier, hold lessons 
for the women’s movement, as our panelists observe. While there was some urban-based 
protest after the motorway rape, the numbers who came out were relatively few. This was 
attributed to a failure of feminist groups to build cross-class alliances with other movements, 
such as peasants and labour groups, rather than an outcome of the pandemic’s impact on 
public mobilisations. Even though women have accomplished some significant legal and 
policy reforms in recent years, despite their relatively small numbers, some of the laws they 
advocated for are being used against them. For example, sexual harassment laws have 
enabled women to file cases, but in the absence of protective mechanisms they are subjected 
to defamation charges and thus eventually silenced. Child marriage, too, became more 
difficult in Sindh province when it raised the age of marriage from 16 to 18 for girls, bringing 
it at par with boys. But the Arzoo case reveals how difficult it is to implement the law and 
protect girls in the most vulnerable communities. Civil society groups, albeit limited in terms 
of mass mobilizations, effectively voiced their concerns in the corridors of power and 
through media. Using social media, mainstream press and television, and old-fashioned street 
protests, they pushed government to be partially responsive. 
 
 
G. Labour and Livelihoods 
 
[T]he lower class is the most productive class in our society and also the most vulnerable. 
Nasir Mansoor, NTUF leader.  
 
 
Workers have been laid off from jobs in the formal and informal sectors, directly due to 
lockdown restrictions and the deepening burden on Pakistan’s weak economy. Public sector 
lay-offs and plans to develop off-shore projects have added to tensions between Sindh and 
the federal government. While interest groups representing disparate sectors of the workforce 
protested against job and income loss during the pandemic, as months wore on they appeared 
to be developing new coalitions to further their aims. 
 
To mitigate the effects of the first lockdown, the Sindh government issued an ordinance 
stating for a three-month period no employees could be fired, and all dues were to be paid to 
them. Employers in turn moved the court, arguing against the ordinance, but it was soon 
made law. Meanwhile, in the other provinces, workers suffered without the benefits of this 
protective measure.142 
 
The Home-Based Women Workers Foundation (HBWWF) and National Trade Union 
Federation (NTUF) organized a combined rally against IMF’s privatization policies and the 
unconstitutional occupation of Sindh’s islands. The leader of the trade union federation 
agreed to speak up for the rights of all workers affected by the current economic slowdown, 
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including those in the informal sector since most are not unionized. Some believe that women 
home-based workers are the most affected by the major shock to the informal sector. Thus, in 
November, HBWWF and NTUF marched together in Karachi holding red flags, banners and 
placards with their demands, while observing Covid-19 SOPs. They beat empty platters to 
remind authorities the poor were left to manage Covid-19 together with rising inflation, 
which jumped to 14 percent.143 Due to devaluation of the Pakistani rupee, the real wages of 
laborers dropped by 50 percent. Protestors said the state had pushed workers “into the slavery 
of the IMF” and demanded government to fix the minimum wage at Rs.30,000.144 
 
The Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF), a civil society organization representing the fishing 
community in coastal areas of Pakistan, began to mobilize in September 2020 against plans to 
develop two islands off the coast of Karachi and the federal government’s decision to provide 
license to deep-sea fishing trawlers. PFF claimed the island development would ruin fishing 
habitats, threaten their livelihoods and damage the ecology.145  
 
The plans exacerbated the tensions between the federal government and Sindh provincial 
government. Ignoring PFF protests, President Alvi promulgated a Pakistani Islands 
Development Authority (PIDA) Ordinance that specifically mentioned these two islands.146 
PIDA is directly answerable to the Prime Minister, and empowered to retain, lease, sell, 
exchange, rent or otherwise dispose of any land vested in it. The Sindh government asked the 
federal government to immediately withdraw the PIDA ordinance as the islands that 
belonged to the people and government of Sindh.147 
 
The federal-provincial conflict continues due to confusion over who owns the islands. 
According to the PFF President, Mohammad Ali Shah, they prevented a Dubai-based 
company from starting a building project on the islands a few years ago. Shah says, “[T]his 
not development, it’s an attack by the Center on the integrity and autonomy of Sindh, it’s an 
attack on the 18th amendment, it’s an attack on the source of income and life of two and half 
million fishing communities. This cannot be called the development.”148 Several Pakistani 
political parties including Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) and activist groups held 
rallies against PIDA, charging that the coastal area stretching for over a thousand kilometers 
is becoming out-of-bounds for locals in the name of development or security 
 
The coalition of groups opposed to the islands’ development and PIDA is growing and 
coalescing with other concerns amongst civil society in Sindh. The Karachi Bar Association 
has already rejected PIDA;149 and the Sindh and Balochistan assemblies passed a resolution 
against the Ordinance.150 In November 2020, a Sindh Action Committee (SAC) organized a 
rally to reverse PIDA. Protestors including women and youth carried placards to ‘save 
islands, save Sindh’ and ‘release missing persons’. SAC accused the Sindh government of 
surrendering the provincial autonomy secured after devolution was granted by the 2010 
constitutional amendment.151 It decided to launch a three-month campaign against the PIDA 
Ordinance, during which also plans to raise the missing persons’ issue as well as the 
termination of Pakistan Steel Mills employees.152 
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The federal government down-sized major public sector enterprises through privatization 
plans and lay-offs which continue despite the pandemic’s economic fall-out. In October 
2020, seven hundred employees of Radio Pakistan staged a mass sit-in against their recent 
sacking. Although they generated response amongst politicians, they have not yet been 
restored.153 Next, Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM) sacked over 4,500 employees in Karachi. The 
government argued its losses exceeded Rs.176 billion thus it needed to be privatized.154 The 
Minister of Labor in Sindh called this an “anti-laborer move”.155 PSM employees protested 
against the decision - imposed by IMF - to privatize the mills in June 2020.156 In November 
2020, the retrenched workers staged a sit-in on Karachi’s railway tracks disrupting the 
departures and arrivals of several passengers. They ended the protest after receiving 
assurances from the Sindh government it would take up the issue with the federal 
government.157 
 
While much of the agitation mentioned here has involved Sindh province, Punjab has also 
seen a growing share of discontent around issues of labour and livelihoods. The agricultural 
sector is the backbone of Pakistan’s economy, employing 44 percent of its 65 million-strong 
labor force, mostly in Punjab. The urban-focussed media rarely covers farmers’ demands, so 
in November 2020 farmers belonging to Kissan Ittehad (KI) and Pakistan’s Farmer’s Board 
came to Lahore to demand a uniform tariff rate for electricity to run tube-wells, an increase in 
the government’s purchase rate of wheat and sugarcane, and a price reduction on fertilizers 
and pesticides amongst all provinces.158 The peaceful protest was met with batons, tear-gas 
and water cannons which took the life of one leader.159 Another farmer died in the struggle 
and 12 farmers are missing after police conducted raids to arrest farmer leaders. Civil society 
and rights activists in Karachi condemned the violence against protesting farmers in and 
demanded a judicial inquiry. 
 
The high prices of wheat have a ripple effect in other areas of the country, too. The 
association of nanbais (flat breadmakers) in Balochistan demanded to sell nan weighing 350 
grams at Rs.30.160 One faction of the association continued the agitation and closed their 
shops, leading to police intervention.161 Labour rights activists say this episode indicates the 
need for dialogue amongst the provinces to ensure common prices of essential items to 
protect the working class and poor.162 
 
 
II. Regulating Civic Spaces 
 
The pandemic did not result in the state reviewing or slowing its on-going effort to restrict 
civic spaces through imposing new rules and regulations on the functioning of NGOs, online 
apps and games, and mainstream media. 
Since 2019, the federal and provincial governments have been pressured by security agencies 
into establishing new Charity Commissions in their jurisdictions to register all non-profit 
organizations, adding an unwelcome new bureaucratic requirement to their work. This has 
created confusion and competition amongst organizations, as some NGOs lobby to gain 
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exemption, or new NGOs supportive of the state get registered. The government policy of 
regulating NGOs is reflected in its National Action Plan that combines foreign and domestic 
policy initiatives to crack down and eliminate proscribed organizations across the country. 
Major national advocacy NGOs have had their registration permission removed, and have 
been forced to reapply – in the meanwhile several NGOs had to lay off workers and operate 
with reduced donor funding.163 As the country began transitioning from the pandemic’s first 
wave, the Punjab government made it mandatory for all NGOs to register with the Punjab 
Charity Commission’s portal in a span of 30 days.164 
To resist this move, a dozen NGOs and civil society organizations filed a joint petition at the 
Lahore High Court against the new requirement in July 2020. Representing the petitioners, 
Advocate Hina Jilani argued the government never consulted any civil society organisations 
likely to be affected by the new law, and imposing a deadline during a pandemic when most 
NGO offices were either closed or partially working, was not justified. Jilani won a stay from 
the court.165 
The added registration requirements for NGOs negatively impacted the sector. Several 
organisations found the new registration form convoluted, and claimed government did not 
provide them adequate support to adhere to the new conditions.166 Our panelist believed that as 
a consequence of the increased legal and bureaucratic hurdles to NGOs, donor organizations 
began to fund less visible organizations, not involved in advocacy work, to ensure some of 
their development programmes would still be implemented.  
Weaponizing PECA 
The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) 2016 empowered the Pakistan 
Telecommunications Authority (PTA) to block apps or websites under Article 37 if their 
content is “against the glory of Islam, integrity, security and defence of Pakistan, public 
order, morality or contemptuous.” PTA was granted authority to interpret the law, remove 
content and make arrests, in violation of the freedom of speech granted through Article 19 of 
the Constitution.167 In September, the Federal Investigation Agency used PECA to charge 
nine women for transmitting defamatory information against celebrity singer Ali Zafar who 
was accused by his colleague of sexual harassment in 2018.168 Next, the Pakistan Federation 
Union of Journalists (PFUJ) expressed grave concern after 49 journalists and social media 
activists were charged under PECA.169  
Government introduced new rules in October 2020 under PECA to give legal cover to issue 
blanket bans on digital content. The Removal and Blocking of Unlawful Online Content 
(Procedure, Oversight and Safeguards) Rules 2020 require that any platform with more than 
half a million users will have to register with the PTA within nine months and establish a 
permanent office and database servers in Pakistan in the next 18 months. Jeff Paine, 
managing director of Asia Internet Coalition (AIC) stated that “The draconian data 
localisation requirements will damage the ability of people to access a free and open internet 
and shut Pakistan’s digital economy off from the rest of the world.”170 The rules go a step 
 29 
further by defining the “glory of Islam” as per the blasphemy laws of Pakistan under Chapter 
XV of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). This can be used to threaten the already persecuted 
religious minorities, and can be abused to curb the progressive voices in Pakistan. Recently, 
Islamabad High Court Chief Justice Athar Minallah rebuked the government over the 
controversial new social media rules calling them unconstitutional.171 
As a result of the climate of fear and regulatory regime, self-censorship prevents even some 
activists from speaking out on social media. Supporters of PECA argued it would restrict 
online extremist content, prosecute hate speech, and curb harassment of women on the 
internet. But critics contend that due to the undue powers granted to regulatory authorities, it 
has the opposite effect. Benazir Shah, editor at a major television channel, explained the law 
was being manipulated to silence women activists and journalists, in fact to criminalize 
journalism in Pakistan.172 Activists have been accused of blasphemy, surveilled and arrested 
by the police for anti-state tweets, or silenced when their personal morality is questioned by 
social media actors, often at the behest of political interests. Shah herself was targeted by the 
ruling party PTI in its campaign against women journalists who critiqued the government’s 
coverage of the pandemic. As a consequence, she hesitated to tweet for fear of being accused 
on social media for spreading fake news and harassed.173 
Ban on apps and games  
Government sought to restrict online applications and video games on the grounds that they 
fostered immorality. The authorities banned the popular game PUB-G after they received 
complaints it led to violence and addiction amongst users,174 but it was soon overturned by 
the Islamabad High Court.175 Meanwhile, the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority 
banned the video-streaming app Bigo and gave a final warning to Tik-Tok based on 
complaints of “immoral, obscene and vulgar content”.176 It  temporarily blocked the app after 
deleting 3.7 million videos that violated moral guidelines.177 This block was overturned after 
just ten days when the developers assured the authorities it would moderate Tik-Tok’s 
content based on local laws.178 Next, the authorities banned five dating apps because 
homosexuality and extra-marital relationships are illegal in the Pakistan and the developers 
did not adequately moderate the content.179 The Supreme Court hinted at the possibility of 
banning YouTube again for inciting hatred against members of the judiciary, government, 
and armed forces. (It was banned in Pakistan for three years to block offensive content.)180 
 
III. Politics, Civil Society and the Implications for Governance 
 
The provincial governments do not share the federal government’s dim view of civil society 
entirely, depending on which party is in power. In Sindh, with a more progressive party 
running government, there is greater collaboration and discourse with civil society groups. 
The ruling People’s Party provided security cover to the Aurat March (annual International 
Women’s Day event) when the conservative lobby threatened to attack their protest 
venues.181 Women’s advocacy NGOs worked together with the Sindh Commission on the 
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Status of Women to develop a gender policy for women under Covid-19, endorsed by the 
provincial government.182  
 
The review of changing civic spaces reveals that trends existing prior to this disaster possibly 
accelerated since the pandemic began, and triggered some new configurations and 
mobilizations as well. The acceleration is deeply linked with political interests and 
stakeholders, which in turn has implications for governance in the medium and long-term in 
Pakistan. The year saw increasing tension between the Sindh provincial government and the 
Center, and the consolidation of an opposition political coalition to overthrow the current 
government. These developments present distinct challenges to civil society, as it struggles to 





The first months of the pandemic in 2020 (March-June) exacerbated existing tensions 
between federal and provincial governments.183 Differences emerged over handling of the 
pandemic and lockdown measures in the first wave. Next, the federal government revived the 
debate over the 2010 18th constitutional amendment which increased the power and control of 
the provinces over their own finance and development.184 Floods in August 2020 brought an 
unwelcome focus on urban flooding city of Karachi, generating criticism from the federal 
government about the state of the city and collapse of its infrastructure. Sindh resisted the 
federal government’s imposition of the Single National Curriculum and its calls for human 
rights to be included in the syllabus. The provincial government also said it will not allow the 
controversial development of islands, discussed above. By the end of the year, it became 
clear that the main tension was with the Sindh provincial government, the only provincial 
government led by an opposition political party, the PPP. 
 
Our panelists believed a political trend from the center is underway to reverse provincial 
autonomy and centralize government powers. Political, ethnic and religious tensions were 
being exploited to create a law and order situation to justify returning to a highly centralized 
regime of governance. This approach entails controlling the narrative – political and 
ideological – which the SNC, Punjab bill, attacks on independent and other media, exemplify. 
This is furthered by undermining of the provincial government in Sindh. When rumours 
began in Karachi that it should become a separate province in its own right, this was possibly 
another attempt to sow political dissent in Sindh and re-open ethnic tensions between the 
Sindh, Pashtun and Urdu-speaking Mohajir populations.  
 
During the second half of August 2020, severe monsoon rains caused floods, deaths and 
widespread destruction across Pakistan.185 In Sindh province’s largest city, Karachi, urban 
flooding and infrastructure collapse did not spare even the affluent southern residential areas. 
Coastal Sindh also flooded and remained inaccessible for days. The federal government 
announced a special Rs. 1.1 trillion package fund to improve Karachi’s infrastructure, to be 
implemented through a Provincial Coordination Implementation Committee (PCIC), Khan 
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said that other stakeholders such as the army will play a big role in the plan’s execution 
because they help civilian administration whenever there are floods or calamity.186 PCIC will 
include representatives from civil society to monitor the financial accountability of the fund, 
which is seen as state responsiveness to the elite protests post-urban flooding in early 
September 2020.  
 
The consolidation of an opposition political coalition 
 
After the 2018 elections, political parties other than the ruling PTI suffered severe setbacks 
which weakened their position on the national stage. The National Accountability Bureau 
arrested and charged numerous senior politicians from the PPP and PML(N) with corruption, 
embroiling them in court cases that preoccupied the country and damaged their image. 
Parliament, as vibrant arena for political debate and negotiation, took a backstage while the 
new government avoided legislation and engagement across the aisles. Our panelists noted 
that political parties, together with leading civil society organizations, were unable to prevent 
the growing restrictions on civil freedom and public discourse.  
 
Opposition political parties were thus set on a confrontation course against the government. 
During October a new eleven-party opposition alliance to overthrow the government called 
Pakistan Democratic Movement was formed to challenge the military’s interference in 
politics and force the current government to resign. Led by three mainstream opposition 
parties – PML-N, PPP and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), they charge the 2018 elections 
were rigged. PDM held rallies in all four of Pakistan’s provinces, drawing thousands to voice 
their demands to oust the Prime Minister from power and hold free and fair elections, despite 
fears of a second wave of Covid-19 and government threats of legal action if coronavirus 
cases spiked after the events.187 PDM launched a ‘Charter of Pakistan’, with a dozen goals 
including reforms for free and fair elections.188 Over 500 opposition figures and activists, 
mainly from the opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party were arrested in 
before these protest meetings.  
 
Each side blamed the other for using politicizing the pandemic. PDM has accused the ruling 
government for mixed messaging. It banned public gatherings strategically a day after 
elections in the northern Gilgit-Baltistan region, which PTI won.189 Government allowed the 
TLP meetings and funeral to go ahead, but refused permission for PDM rallies due to the 
second wave, saying the opposition politicians did not care for the lives of the people they 
endanger through public protests. 
 
 
Challenges facing civil society 
 
Civil society actors and groups must negotiate intensified challenges due to political 
developments, pressures on civic space, and the pandemic crisis. Those demanding greater 
civic spaces and freedoms, whether to criticize the discriminatory blasphemy laws, revive 
student unions, or demand the rights of women and religious minorities, are all vulnerable to 
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charges of sedition and blasphemy. Our panelists observed the state has always alleged that 
progressive voices work for the interests of western countries, but now they are silenced 
through accusations of treason and sedition. The gap between armed and unarmed protest has 
been shut in the minds of the intelligence agencies, making it very dangerous to be a civil 
society activist.  
 
The media is closely monitored through direct and indirect methods. Credible data about the 
pandemic’s impact is not available, as unofficial sources of data about the spread of Covid-19 
have been blocked and the government statistics may be underreporting disease spread and 
deaths. The government withholds advertising to those media outlets and newspapers whose 
coverage is critical of the ruling party or the military. It is difficult to assess the strength of 
civil society mobilizations based on mainstream coverage.  
 
Fear and violence appear to be a political strategy to silence both political and civil society 
voices. To contend with this strategy, activists will need to change their strategies. Women 
activists need to build stronger alliances with politicians, even in the ruling party, who speak 
out for women’s rights. In a context where society has been successfully radicalized (through 
the state’s own project), in fact there is a strong consensus – even among many women – in 
support of misogyny. Keeping women afraid and within the home can be viewed as part of a 
deeper political project, sustained by the state’s impunity for violators and inability to 
strengthen the criminal justice system.  
 
Fear of violence also makes other civil society groups compete with one another for state 
protection. Religious minority groups are silenced through sectarian attacks and blasphemy 
charges, with growing popular support in some cases. Ethno-political groups are widely 
perceived to be supported by intelligence agencies to stir up street violence and maintain 
political disequilibrium. The net result is that both civil society and political forces live in 
fear of violence and do not unite.  
 
There is currently ‘no space to breathe’, as one panelist said. The spaces for public debate on 
vital issues are so constrained through regulation of NGOs and control of media and 
narrative, that actors cannot fully engage with one another to discuss the socio-economic 
impact of Covid-19 and the solutions needed for Pakistan. Civil society organizations cannot 
engage confidently and openly in important debates about how to work with the PDM, which 
has become a mouthpiece for many activist issues such as media freedoms, missing persons, 
military interference in governance, and gender-based violence.  
 
The current climate will require rights-based organizations to adapt their strategy as they 
struggle to secure funds and space to operate. Our panelists believe that over the last four 
decades advocacy NGOs have indeed helped to change Pakistan and built a constituency at 
the grass-roots for human rights, democracy, religious freedom, and gender justice. Evidence 
for this may be found in the successful movement for increased women’s political 
participation in democratic processes.190 Yet advocacy NGOs rely on the support of donor 
agencies, which is less reliable as new restrictions on eligibility for foreign funding are 
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implemented. It is unclear if donor agencies are in a position to push the Pakistan government 
to allow them to continue supporting rights-based work. 
 
The pandemic and August flood disaster reinforced the state’s preference for NGOs that 
provide services in the health and education sector, i.e. welfare organizations. Flood relief 
efforts have sprung up around the country, and major non-profit health organizations are 
working with government to provide testing facilities, run vaccine trials, and generate public 
messaging on Covid-19. This suggests the importance of civil society in basic service 
provision will continue to grow, pushing advocacy organizations and rights-based efforts 
further into the background. 
 
Civil society is divided and without a nucleus for struggle. Associations and alliances 
amongst civil society have been factionalized into groups that are pro-government and those 
that are not. These divisions can be seen across sectors: amongst journalists, lawyers, medical 
professionals, and even NGOs. Avowedly rights-based progressive groups are suffering 
under constraints of funding, hundreds of NGOs were shut down after their registration was 
denied, and even some of the oldest advocacy NGOs may have their permission to operate 
revoked under the guise of meeting requirements.  
 
Thus, new alliances need to be created to contend with shrinking civic space. For example, in 
the 1990s when the government sought to restrict the functioning and foreign funding to 
rights-based NGOs, they formed national and provincial coalition platforms to advocate 
against these measures. Today, alliances amongst civil society groups need to be broadened 
to include associations that represent students, teachers, journalists, health service providers, 
bar associations, and others in order to resist the closure of spaces more effectively. In this 
vein, some leaders of civil society organizations are beginning to support the PDM. This is 
not without some reservations, as our panelists recall the many restrictions on NGOs and 
digital spaces that began during the tenure of these opposition parties while they were in 
government. Although these same politicians now speak up on these concerns at rallies, 
whether this will translate into the issues being raised in the assemblies remains to be seen.  
 
Real agency for change may lie with the opposition political movement more than civic 
spaces at present. Our panelists agreed that civil society must support those who seek to 
expand democratic spaces at present, despite differences on specific issues. Political 
opposition may gain momentum in the near future by winning support from those whose 
livelihoods are most affected by the economic downturn under Covid-19. The role of civil 
society should be to retain maximalist positions while strategically supporting PDM on its 
platform to ensure free and fair elections and secure the democratic process. The 
consolidation of an inclusive, participatory democracy will require that civic and political 
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